List of Publications

Refereed papers in professional journals

• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, S. Müller, F. Pourbabaee, O. Tamuz “The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning” Theoretical Economics accepted 2024.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, “A population’s feasible posterior beliefs,” Journal of Economic Theory, 215 105-764, 2024.
• I. Arieli, M. Koren, and R. Smorodinsky, “Information Aggregation in Large Collective Purchases. Economic Theory, 1-51, 2023.
• I. Arieli, R. Gradwohl, and R. Smorodinsky, “Herd Design,” American Economic Review: Insights  Vol. 5, NO. 4, pp. 460-76, 2023, (EC’ 22).
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, R. Smorodinsky, T. Yamashita:
  “Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling,”  Theoretical Economics 18.1; 15-36, 2023, (EC 2020).
• I. Arieli, M.Koren, and R. Smorodinsky “The Implication of Pricing on Social Learning,” Theoretical Economics, 17.4, 1761–1802, 2022 (EC’19).
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, and M. Mueller-Frank, “Learning Through Probability Overmatching” Operations Research, 70(6), 3420-3431, 2022 (EC’19).
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, F. Sandomirskiy, O. Tamuz “Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs” Journal of Political Economy, 129(9), 2546-2594, 2021, (EC20, Best Paper Award).
• I. Arieli, M. Mueller-Frank “A general Analysis of Social Learning” Mathematics of Operations Research, 46(4), 1235-1249, 2021.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, and S. Shlomov “Virtually Additive Learning,” Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 197, 105322, 2021.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, and R. Smorodinsky “Identifiable Information Structures,’’ Games and Economic Behavior, 120, p. 16-27, 2020.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, R. Peretz, and H.P., Young “The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social networks,’’ Econometrica, 88(2), p. 569-594, 2020.
• I. Arieli and Y. Babichenko “Private Bayesian Persuasion,” Journal of Economic Theory, 182 p. 185-217, 2019.
• I. Arieli, and M. Mueller-Frank, “Multidimensional Social Learning,” Review of Economic Studies, 86, p. 213-240, 2019.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, and R. Smorodinsky, “Robust Forecast Aggregation” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115 (52), pp. 12135-12143, 2018.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, and M. Tennenholtz, “Sequential  Commitment Games,” Games and Economic Behavior Vol 105, 297-315, 2017.
• I. Arieli, “Payoff Externalities and Social Learning, ”Games and Economic Behavior,  Vol 104, 392-410, 2017.
• I. Arieli, and M. Mueller-Frank, “Inferring Beliefs from Actions,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol 102, 455-461, 2017.
• I. Arieli and Y. Babichenko “Random Extensive Form Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 166, p. 517-535, 2016.
• I. Arieli, and H.P. Young, “Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games,” Econometrica, Vol 84, p. 627-676, issue 2, 2016.
• I. Arieli, and R.J. Aumann, “The Logic of Backward Induction” Journal of Economic Theory, p. 443-464, 2015.
• I. Arieli, and Y.J. Levi, “Determinacy of Games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring,” Games and Economic Behavior 91 p. 166-185, 2015.
• I. Arieli, “Transfer Implementation in Congestion Games,” Dynamic Games and Applications 5 p. 228-238, 2015.
• I. Arieli and Y. Babichenko “Average Testing and Pareto Efficiency,” Journal of Economic Theory 147 p. 2376-2398, 2012.
• I. Arieli and Y. Levi, “Infinite Sequential Games with Perfect but Incomplete Information,” International Journal of Game Theory. 40 (2) p. 207-213, 2011.
• I. Arieli “Rationalizability in Continuous Games,” Journal of Mathematical Economics. 46 (5) p. 212-224, 2010.

Refereed Papers in Conference Proceedings and Working Papers

• I. Arieli and S. Arigapudi,  “Private Signals and Fast Product Adoption Under Incomplete Information” working paper.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko,  Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi, Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions, EC’23, 2023.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, S. Müller, F. Pourbabaee, O. Tamuz, The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning, EC’23, 2023.
• I. Arieli, R. Gradwohl, R. Smorodinsky, Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk, EC’ 23 2023.
• I. Arieli, I. Geffner, M. Tennenholts, Mediated Cheap Talk, AAAI, 2023.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, F. Sandomirskiy “Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators,” 2022 working paper.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, “A Population’s Feasible Posterior Beliefs,” 2022 working paper.
• G. Amir, I. Arieli, G. Ashkenazi-Goan, and R. Peretz, “Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks,” 2021, Working paper.
• I. Arieli, F. Sandomirskiy, R. Smorodinsky, “On Social Networks that Support Learning,” EC2021.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, and M. Mueller-Frank, “Sequential Naive Learning,”  EC2021.
• I. Arieli, Y. Babichenko, R. Smorodinsky, T. Yamashita:
  Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling. EC 2020.
• I. Arieli, M.Koren, and R. Smorodinsky “The Implication of Pricing on Social Learning” EC’19, 2019.
• I. Arieli, M. Koren, and R. Smorodinsky “The One-Shot Crowdfunding  Game,” EC’18, 2018.
• I. Arieli and Y. Babichenko, R. Smorodinsky, “Forecast Aggregation” EC’17, 2017.
• I. Arieli and Y. Babichenko, “Simple Approximate Equilibrium in Games with Many players,” EC’17, 2017.
• I. Arieli, M. Koren, and R. Smorodinsky “The Crowdfunding Game,” WINE, 2017.